Everywhere, we have distinguished the problem from the righteous of the deliberator model. Now, the strongest that could be invoked for a contractual argument is that the result of the deliberative model is both the right solution to the just problem and the conclusion that „R hat N“ is constituted. In this „constructivist“ reading of the result of the deliberative model, there is no independent and external justification that R N has what should bring the contractual apparatus closer together, but that R is the result of the deliberative model is the creator of truth for „R has N“. The state of nature is therefore not the same as the state of war as it is according to Hobbes. It can, however, be put into a state of war, especially in a state of war for property conflicts. While the state of nature is that of freedom, in which men recognize the law of nature and therefore do not harm each other, the state of war between two or more men begins as soon as one man declares war on another by stealing war from him or trying to make him his slave. Since there is no civil power in the state of nature against which people can appeal, and since the law of nature allows them to defend their own lives, they can then kill those who would appeal to them. Since the natural state does not have civilian authority, it is likely that the war will continue after the start of the war. And this is one of the strongest reasons why men must leave the state of nature by coming together to form a civilian government. Whether social contracts are explicit or implicit, they provide a valuable framework for harmony in society. The term „social contract“ is increasingly used in social science literature to describe phrases of state-of-the-art relations, particularly with regard to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). However, the concept is not conceptual enough and its potential for information on a systematic analysis of contemporary states is not sufficiently exploited. This article helps fill this gap.

It defines social contracts as formal and informal agreements between social groups and their sovereign parties (government or other) on rights and obligations. We argue that social contracts are partly informal institutions that aim to make state-society interactions more predictable and thus to make politics more stable. Their effectiveness depends on their substance (between government and services exchanged by society), the magnitude (the actors concerned and the geographical sphere of influence) and the temporal dimension (beginning, evolution and duration). Social contracts can vary considerably in all three dimensions. But these arguments were based on a corporatist theory of Roman law, according to which „a populus“ can exist as an autonomous legal entity. Thus, in these arguments, it has been argued that a group of people can join a government because it is capable of exercising a single will and making decisions with one voice, without sovereign authority – a concept rejected by Hobbes and the theorists of the treaty. According to Locke, the state of nature is not a condition of the individual, as is the case with Hobbes. On the contrary, it is populated by mothers and fathers with their children or families – what he calls the „marital society“ (para. 78). These societies are based on voluntary agreements to care for children together, and they are moral, but not political.

Political society is born when men who represent their families gather in the state of nature and who each abandon the executive to punish those who go beyond natural law and leave that power to the public power to a government.

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